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Abstract—Constrained shortest distance (CSD) querying is one
of the fundamental graph query primitives, which finds the
shortest distance from an origin to a destination in a graph
with a constraint that the total cost does not exceed a given
threshold. CSD querying has a wide range of applications,
such as routing in telecommunications and transportation. With
an increasing prevalence of cloud computing paradigm, graph
owners desire to outsource their graphs to cloud servers. In
order to protect sensitive information, these graphs are usually
encrypted before being outsourced to the cloud. This, however,
imposes a great challenge to CSD querying over encrypted
graphs. Since performing constraint filtering is an intractable
task, existing work mainly focuses on unconstrained shortest
distance queries. CSD querying over encrypted graphs remains
an open research problem.
In this paper, we propose Connor, a novel graph encryption
scheme that enables approximate CSD querying. Connor is built
based on an efficient, tree-based ciphertext comparison protocol,
and makes use of symmetric-key primitives and the somewhat
homomorphic encryption, making it computationally efficient.
Using Connor, a graph owner can first encrypt privacy-sensitive
graphs and then outsource them to the cloud server, achieving
the necessary privacy without losing the ability of querying.
Extensive experiments with real-world datasets demonstrate the
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed graph encryption
scheme.
Index Terms—Cloud Computing, Privacy, Graph Encryption,
Constrained Shortest Distance Querying
I. INTRODUCTION
REcent years have witnessed the prosperity of applicationsbased on graph-structured data [1, 2], such as online
social networks, road networks, web graphs [3], biological
networks, and communication networks [4, 5]. Consequently,
many systems for managing, querying, and analyzing massive
graphs have been proposed in both academia (e.g., GraphLab
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[6], Pregel [7] and TurboGraph [8]) and industry (e.g., Titan,
DEX and GraphBase). With the prevalence of cloud comput-
ing, graph owners (e.g., enterprises and startups for graph-
based services) desire to outsource their graph databases to a
cloud server, which raises a great concern regarding privacy.
An intuitive way to enhance data privacy is encrypting graphs
before outsourcing them to the cloud. This, however, usually
comes at the price of inefficiency, because it is quite difficult
to perform operations over encrypted graphs.
Shortest distance querying is one of the most fundamental
graph operations, which finds the shortest distance, according
to a specific criterion, for a given pair of source and destination
in a graph. In practice, however, users may consider multiple
criteria when performing shortest distance queries [2]. Taking
the road network as an example, a user may want to know
the shortest distance, in terms of travelling time, between two
cities within a budget for total toll payment. This problem can
be represented by a constrained shortest distance (CSD) query,
which finds the shortest distance based on one criterion with
one or more constraints on other criteria.
In this paper, we focus on single-constraint CSD queries.
This is because most practical problems can be represented as
a single-constraint CSD query. For instance, such a query on a
communication network could return the minimum cost from
a starting node to a terminus node, with a threshold on routing
delay. In addition, multi-constraint CSD queries can usually be
decomposed into a group of sub-queries, each of which can be
abstracted as a single-constraint CSD query. Formally, a CSD
query1 is such that: given an origin s, a destination t, and a
cost constraint θ, finding the shortest distance between s and
t whose total cost c does not exceed θ.
Existing studies in this area can be roughly classified into
two categories. The first category mainly focuses on the CSD
query problem over unencrypted graphs [2, 9–12]. However,
these methods cannot be easily applied in the encrypted
graph environment, because many operations on plain graphs
required in these methods (e.g., addition, multiplication, and
comparison) cannot be carried out successfully without a
special design for encrypted graphs. The second category aims
at enabling the shortest distance (or shortest path) queries over
encrypted graphs [1, 13]. They usually adopt distance oracles
such that the approximate distance between any two vertices
1For simplicity, we refer to single-constraint CSD queries as CSD queries
hereafter.
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2can be efficiently computed, e.g., in a sublinear way. The main
limitation of these approaches is that they are incapable of
performing constraint filtering over the cloud-based encrypted
graphs. Therefore, they cannot be directly applied to answering
CSD queries.
Motivated by the limitations of existing schemes, our goal
in this paper is to design a practical graph encryption scheme
that enables CSD queries over encrypted graphs. As the CSD
problem over plain graphs has been proved to be NP-hard
[10], existing studies (e.g., [2]) usually resort to approximate
solutions, which guarantee that the resulting distance is no
longer than α times of the shortest distance (where α is an
approximation ratio predefined by graph owners), subject to
the cost constraint θ. The encryption of graphs would make the
CSD problem even more complicated. Hence, we also focus
on devising an approximate solution.
Specifically, this paper presents Connor, a novel graph
encryption scheme targeting the approximate CSD querying
over encrypted graphs. Connor is built on a secure 2-hop
cover labeling index (2HCLI), which is a type of distance
oracle such that the approximate distance between any two
vertices in a graph can be efficiently computed [1, 2]. The
vertices of the graph in the secure 2HCLI are encrypted
by particular pseudo-random functions (PRFs). In order to
protect real values of graph attributes while allowing for cost
filtering, we encrypt costs and distances (between pairs of
vertices) by the order-revealing encryption (ORE) [14, 15]
and the somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) [16],
respectively. Based on the ORE, we design a simple but
efficient tree-based ciphertexts comparison protocol, which can
accelerate the constraint filtering process on the cloud side.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) We propose a novel graph encryption scheme, Connor,
which enables the approximate CSD querying. It can
answer an α-CSD query in milliseconds and thereby
achieves computational efficiency.
2) We design a tree-based ciphertexts comparison protocol,
which helps us to determine the relationship of the sum
of two integers and another integer over their ciphertexts
with controlled disclosure. This protocol can also serve as
a building block in other relevant application scenarios.
3) We present a thorough security analysis of Connor and
demonstrate that it achieves the latest security definition
named CQA2-security [17]. We also implement a pro-
totype and conduct extensive experiments on real-world
datasets. The evaluation results show the effectiveness
and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
enables the approximate CSD querying over encrypted graphs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We summarize
the related work in Section II and describe the background
of the approximate CSD querying in Section III. We formally
define the privacy-preserving approximate CSD querying prob-
lem in Section IV. After that, the construction of Connor
is presented in Section V, with a detailed description of the
tree-based ciphertexts comparison protocol in Section VI. We
exhibit the complexity and security analyses in Section VII,
evaluate the proposed scheme through extensive experiments
in Section VIII, and conclude this paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
In an era of cloud computing, security and privacy become
great concerns of cloud service users [18–23]. Here we briefly
summarize the related work from two aspects, i.e., CSD
querying over plain graphs and graph privacy protection.
Plain CSD queries. The constrained shortest distance/path
querying over plain graphs has attracted many research atten-
tions. Hansen [9] proposed an augmented Dijkstra’s algorithm
for exact constrained shortest path queries without an index.
This method, however, resulted in a significant computational
burden. In order to improve the querying efficiency, another
solution [11] focused on approximate constrained shortest path
queries, which were also index-free.
The state-of-the-art solution to the exact constrained shortest
path querying with an index was proposed by Storandt [12],
which accelerated query procedure with an indexing technique
called contraction hierarchies. This approach still results in
impractically high query processing cost. Wang et al. [2]
proposed a solution to the approximate constrained shortest
path querying over large-scale road networks. This method
took full advantage of overlay graph techniques to construct
an overlay graph based on the original graph, whose size was
much smaller than that of the original one. Consequently, they
built a constrained labeling index structure over the overlay
graph, which greatly reduced the query cost. Unfortunately,
all these solutions are merely suitable to perform queries over
unencrypted graphs.
Graph privacy protection. Increasing concerns about
graph privacy have been raised with the wide adoption of the
cloud computing paradigm over the past decade. Chase and
Kamara [17] first introduced the notion of graph encryption,
where they proposed several constructions for graph oper-
ations, such as adjacency queries and neighboring queries.
Cao et al. [24] defined and solved the problem of privacy-
preserving query over encrypted graph data in cloud comput-
ing by utilizing the principle of “filtering-and-verification”.
They built the feature-based index of a graph in advance
and then chose the efficient inner product to carry out the
filtering procedure. Some approaches [13, 25, 26] utilized the
differential privacy technique to query graphs privately, which
might suffer from weak security. These studies, however,
introduced prohibitively great storage costs and were not
practical for large-scale graphs. Meng et al. [1] proposed
three computationally efficient constructions that supported the
approximate shortest distance querying with distance oracles,
which were provably secure against a semi-honest cloud
server.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) techniques have
been widely applied to address the privacy-preserving shortest
path problem [27–30], as well as other secure computation
problems [31]. Aly et al. [28] focused on the shortest path
problem over traditional combinatorial graph in a general
multi-party computation setting, and proposed two protocols
for securely computing shortest paths in the graphs. Blanton
3TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATIONS
Notation Meaning
G = (V,E) Input graph
n,m Number of vertices and edges in G
d(e), c(e) Distance and cost of an edge e
d(u, v), c(u, v) Distance and cost of the edge from u to v
s, t, α, φ, θ Origin, destination, approximation ratio,
amplification factor and cost constraint in an
α-CSD query
∆, ∆˜ Plain and encrypted graph index
∆in(v),∆out(v) In- and out-label set associated with vertex v
dθ Depth of a cost constraint tree
β Length of a path code
E(m) ORE ciphertext of m
λ Security parameter
k Output length of ORE encryption
z Input length of symmetric encryption algorithms
τs,t Query token
Y Candidate sets as the outputs of the cost
constraint filtering
B Maximum distance over all the sketches
et al. [27] designed data-oblivious algorithms to securely
solve the single-source single-destination shortest path prob-
lem, which achieved the optimal or near-optimal performance
on dense graphs. Keller and Scholl [29] designed several
oblivious data structures (e.g., priority queues) for SMC and
utilized them to compute shortest paths on general graphs.
Gupta et al. [30] proposed an SMC-based approach for finding
policy-compliant paths that have the least routing cost or
satisfy bandwidth demands among different network domains.
However, existing general-purpose SMC solutions for the
shortest path problem may result in heavy communication
overhead.
Although there are respectable studies on graph querying
over encrypted graphs, the privacy-preserving CSD query
remains unsolved. In this paper, we propose a novel and
efficient graph encryption scheme for CSD queries.
III. BACKGROUND
This section presents the formal definition of the CSD query
problem and introduces the 2HCLI structure for graph queries.
A. Approximate CSD Query
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph2 with a vertex set
V and an edge set E. Each edge e ∈ E is associated with a
distance d(e) ≥ 0 and a cost c(e) ≥ 0. We regard the cost c(e)
as the constraint. We denote the set of edges that connect two
vertices as a path. For a path P = (e1, e2, . . . , ek), its distance
d(P ) is defined as d(P ) =
∑k
i=1 d(ei), which indicates the
distance from its origin to its destination. Similarly, we define
the cost of P as c(P ) =
∑k
i=1 c(ei). The notations throughout
the paper are summarized in Table I.
2We refer to G as a directed graph in this paper, unless otherwise specified.
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Fig. 1. An example illustrating the α-CSD query over a graph.
Given a graph G, an origin vertex s ∈ V , a destination
vertex t ∈ V , and a cost constraint θ, a CSD query is to find
the the shortest distance d between s and t with the total cost
no more than θ. Since the CSD query problem has been proved
to be NP-hard [10], we keep in line with existing solutions [2]
and focus on proposing an approximate CSD solution in this
paper.
Inspired by a common definition of the approximate shortest
path query over plain graphs [2], we define the approximate
CSD query (i.e., α-CSD query) as follows.
Definition 1. (α-CSD QUERY). Given an origin s, a des-
tination t, a cost constraint θ and an approximation ratio α,
an α-CSD query returns the distance d(P ) of a path P , such
that c(P ) ≤ θ and d(P ) ≤ α · dopt, where dopt is the optimal
answer to the exact CSD query with the origin s, destination
t and cost constraint θ.
Fig. 1 shows a simple graph with five vertices, where the
distance and cost of each edge are marked alongside it. Given
an origin a, a destination c, a cost constraint θ = 4, the
exact CSD query returns the optimal distance dopt = 6, where
the corresponding path is (a, b, c). For an approximation ratio
α = 1.5, a valid answer to the α-CSD query with the same
parameters (e.g, the origin a, the destination c, and θ = 4)
is 8, with the corresponding path Pα = (a, e, b, c). That is
because d(Pα) = 8 < α · dopt = 9 and c(Pα) = 3 < θ.
Based on the above definition, given two paths P1 and
P2 with the same origin and destination, we say that P1 α-
dominates P2 iff c(P1) ≤ c(P2) and d(P1) ≤ α · d(P2). With
this principle, we can reduce the construction complexity of
graph index significantly, because a great deal of redundant
entries in the index can be filtered out. We will make a further
illustration in the following subsection.
B. Constructing Labeling Index
The encrypted index designed in this paper is mainly
constructed based on the well-known 2HCLI, which is a
special data structure that supports the shortest distance query
efficiently [2, 32, 33]. Here we briefly describe the basic
idea of the 2HCLI, and illustrate its application in building
a constrained labeling index.
Given a graph G = (V,E) with a vertex set V and an
edge set E, each vertex v ∈ V is associated with an in-label
set and an out-label set, which are denoted by ∆in(v) and
∆out(v), respectively. Each entity in ∆in(v) corresponds to
the shortest distance from a vertex u ∈ V to v. It implies that v
is reachable from u by one or more paths, but is not necessarily
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Fig. 2. A 2HCLI example of the basic shortest distance query. Each entity d
in 2HCLI alongside the arrow indicates the shortest distance from the starting
vertex to the ending vertex, e.g., the shortest distance from a to e is 3.
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Fig. 3. A 2HCLI example of the exact CSD query. Each entity (dis, cost) in
the 2HCLI alongside the arrow indicates the distance and cost, respectively.
The shortest distance from a to e with a cost constraint θ = 4 is 5.
a neighbor, or 2-hop neighbour, of u. Similarly, each entity in
∆out(v) corresponds to the shortest distance from v to another
vertex u in V . To answer a shortest distance query from an
origin s to a destination t, we first find the common vertices
in the labels ∆out(s) and ∆in(t), and then select the shortest
distance from s to t. Note that the entities in ∆in(v) and
∆out(v) are carefully selected [33] so that the distance of any
two vertices s and t can be computed by ∆out(s) and ∆in(t).
Considering the graph in Fig. 1, if we ignore the cost
criterion of edges, the basic unconstrained shortest distance
query with an origin a and a destination c can be answered
with the help of the 2HCLI, as shown in Fig. 2. Given the
labels ∆out(a) and ∆in(c), it is easy to obtain the set of
common vertices, which consists of vertices b and e. The
final answer to the basic shortest distance query should be
5, because d(a, e) + d(e, c) = 5 < d(a, b) + d(b, c) = 6.
Although it is simple and straightforward to construct the
2HCLI for a graph with only the distance criterion, construct-
ing a labeling index based on the 2HCLI for the CSD query
is much more complex. That is because in the CSD query
setting with two types of edge criteria, there might be multiple
combinations of distance and cost for each pair of vertices in
the labels ∆in(v) and ∆out(v). For ease of illustration, we also
take as an example the graph, as well as the CSD query, in
Fig. 1. The corresponding 2HCLI is shown in Fig. 3, where the
2-tuple alongside each arrow represents the distance and cost
from the starting vertex to the ending vertex. Note that in the
shortest distance query in Fig. 2, the shortest distance from a to
c via e is unique. However, in the CSD query setting depicted
in Fig. 3, there are four possible distances with different costs
from a to c via e. Due to the existence of the cost criterion, the
number of possible distances for each pair of vertices could
increase dramatically in large-scale graphs, which results in a
higher complexity in constructing the 2HCLI and calculating
the answers to a CSD query.
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Fig. 4. The resulting 2HCLI after performing the offline filtering on the
original 2HCLI in Fig. 3. Each entity (u, d, c) in the 2HCLI indicates
the vertex identifier, distance and cost, respectively. The answer to the
approximate CSD query (i.e., the origin a, the destination c, α = 1.5, and
θ = 4) is 6, which happens to be the answer to the exact CSD query.
In order to improve the querying efficiency, we adopt a
methodology that combines an offline filtering operation and
an online filtering operation.
The offline filtering aims at reducing the construction com-
plexity of the 2HCLI and decreasing the number of entries in
the in-label and out-label sets as many as possible. We adopt
the method proposed in [2]. The entities in the 2HCLI are
carefully selected in such a way that for any CSD query from
u to v with a cost constraint θ, the query can be answered
correctly using only the 2HCLI. Since the construction of the
2HCLI should be independent of the cost constraint in specific
CSD queries, we can use the definition of α-domination to
filter out redundant entries in the in- and out-label sets.
Taking for example the two entries from e to c with α =
1.5 in Fig. 3, the path P 1ec = (e, b, c) with the (dis, cost)-
tuple of (3,2) α-dominates another path P 2ec = (e, c) with the
(dis, cost)-tuple of (2,6). Therefore, the entry corresponding
to the path P 2ec can be filtered out (as depicted by a dashed
arrow), which helps to reduce the number of entries in ∆in(c).
The resulting 2HCLI is exhibited in Fig. 4. We refer the reader
to [2] for more construction details.
The online filtering aims at selecting the possibly valid
answers to a given CSD query, based on only the 2HCLI.
For instance, given an α-CSD query from a to c with a
cost constraint θ = 4, we can first find the common vertex
set V ′ between ∆out(a) and ∆in(c), and then return the
minimum d(a, v) + d(v, c) with c(a, v) + c(v, c) ≤ θ for each
v ∈ V ′. Since the above comparisons should be conducted
with the corresponding ciphertexts, an efficient online filtering
approach will be devised in Section VI.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section presents the system model and the security
model of the privacy-preserving α-CSD querying, as well as
the preliminaries of the proposed graph encryption scheme.
A. System Model
We adopt the general system model in the literature [1, 17]
for the privacy-preserving α-CSD querying, as illustrated in
Fig. 5, which mainly involves two types of entities, namely a
user and a cloud server.
The user constructs the secure searchable index for the
graph and outsources the encrypted index along with the
encrypted graph to the cloud server. When the user, say Alice,
performs an α-CSD query over her encrypted graph, she first
5User Cloud ServerGraph
Secure Index & Encrypted Graph
Query Token
Query Result
Fig. 5. The system model of privacy-preserving CSD query scheme.
generates a query token and then submits it to the cloud
server. Upon receiving Alice’s query token, the cloud server
executes the pre-designed query algorithms to match entries
in the secure index with the token. Finally, the cloud server
replies the user with the answer to the α-CSD query.
The graph encryption scheme is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. (GRAPH ENCRYPTION). A graph encryption
scheme Π = (KeyGen, Setup,Query) consists of three
polynomial-time algorithms that work as follows:
• (K, pk, sk)← KeyGen(λ): is a probabilistic secret key
generation algorithm that takes as input a security param-
eter λ and outputs a secret key K and a public/secret-key
pair (pk, sk).
• ∆˜ ← Setup(α,K, pk, sk, φ,G): is a graph encryption
algorithm that takes as input an approximation ratio α, a
secret keys K, a key pair (pk, sk), an amplification factor
φ and a graph G, and outputs a secure index ∆˜.
• (distq,⊥) ← Query((K, pk, sk,Φ, q), ∆˜): is a two-
party protocol between a user that holds a secret key K,
a key pair (pk, sk) and a query q, and a cloud server that
holds an encrypted graph index ∆˜. After executing this
protocol, the user receives the distance distq as the query
result and the cloud server receives a terminator ⊥.
B. Security Model
Graph encryption is a generalization of symmetric search-
able encryption (SSE) [34–38]. Thus, we adopt the security
definition of SSE settings in our graph encryption scheme.
This security definition is consistent with the latest proposed
security definition in [17, 35, 39], which is also known as
CQA2-security (i.e., the chosen-query attack security). Now
we present the formal CQA2-security definition as follows.
Definition 3. (CQA2-security model). Let Π =
(KeyGen, Setup,Query) be a graph encryption scheme and
consider the following probabilistic experiments where A is
a semi-honest adversary, S is a simulator, and LSetup and
LQuery are (stateful) leakage functions.
RealΠ,A(λ):
• A outputs a graph G, an approximation ratio α and an
amplification factor φ.
• The challenger begins by running Gen(1λ) to gen-
erate a secret key K and a public/secret-key pair
(pk, sk), and then computes the encrypted index ∆˜
by Setup(α,K, pk, sk, φ,G). The challenger sends the
encrypted index ∆˜ to A.
• A makes a polynomial number of adaptive queries,
and for each query q, A and the challenger execute
Query((K, pk, sk,Φ, q), ∆˜).
• A computes a bit b ∈ {0, 1} as the output of the
experiment.
IdealΠ,A,S(λ):
• A outputs a graph G, an approximation ratio α and an
amplification factor φ.
• Given the leakage function LSetup(G), S simulates a
secure graph index ∆˜∗ and sends it to A.
• A makes a polynomial number of adaptive queries.
For each query q, S is given the leakage function
LQuery(G,Q), and A and S execute a simulation of
Query, where A is playing the role of the cloud server
and S is playing the role of the user.
• A computes a bit b ∈ {0, 1} as the output of the
experiment.
We say that the graph encryption scheme Π =
(KeyGen, Setup,Query) is (LSetup,LQuery)-secure against
the adaptive chosen-query attack, if for all PPT adversaries A,
there exists a PPT simulator S such that
|Pr[RealΠ,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealΠ,A,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ),
where negl(λ) is a negligible function.
C. Preliminaries
Now we briefly introduce an encryption technique employed
in our design, i.e., the order-revealing encryption.
Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a generalization of
the order-preserving encryption (OPE) scheme, but provides
stronger security guarantees. As pointed by Naveed et al.
[40], the OPE-encrypted databases are extremely vulnerable to
inference attacks. To address this limitation, the ORE scheme
has been proposed [14, 15], which is a tuple of three algo-
rithms Π = (ORE.Setup,ORE.Encrypt,ORE.Compare)
described as follows:
• ORE.Setup(1λ)→ sk: Input a security parameter λ, out-
put the secret key sk.
• ORE.Encrypt(sk,m)→ ct: Input a secret key sk and a
message m, output a ciphertext ct.
• ORE.Compare(ct1, ct2)→ z: Input two ciphertexts ct1
and ct2, output a bit r ∈ {0, 1}, which indicates the
greater-than or less-than relationship of the corresponding
plaintexts m1 and m2.
V. CONSTRUCTION OF CONNOR
In this section, we introduce our graph encryption scheme
Connor for the privacy-preserving α-CSD querying.
A. Construction Overview
The construction process is based on two particular pseudo-
random functions h and g, and a somewhat homomorphic
encryption (SWHE) scheme. In this paper, we adopt the
6concrete instantiation of a SWHE scheme in the literature [16].
The parameters of h and g are illustrated in Equation (1),
h : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ (1a)
g : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ+z+k (1b)
where λ is the security parameter, and k and z are the output
lengths of the ORE and SWHE encryptions, respectively.
We start with a straightforward construction GraphEnc1 =
(KeyGen, Setup,Query) as follows, including:
• KeyGen: Given the security parameter λ, the user ran-
domly generates a secret key K and a pair of public and
secret keys (pk, sk) for SWHE.
• Setup: Given an original graph G, an approximation ratio
α, and an amplification factor φ, the user obtains the
encrypted graph index by using Algorithm 1. The 2HCLI
∆ = {∆out,∆in} of G can be generated by the method
described in Section III-B.
Let B be the maximum distance over all the sketches and
N = 2B+1. Motivated by the literature [1], each distance
du,v is encrypted as 2N−du,v by the SWHE to protect its
real value (line 8). Considering that 2x + 2y is bounded
by 2max(x,y)−1, the SWHE encryption of distance allows
for obtaining the minimum sum over a certain number of
distance pairs.
Each cost cu,v , multiplied by the amplification factor φ,
is encrypted by the ORE encryption (line 9). φ is a big
integer and should be carefully selected to enlarge the
plaintext space of cu,v . In practice, the product of φ and
the maximum cost value over all the sketches should be
sufficiently large (e.g., at least 280), which is used to
provide a sufficient randomness to the inputs. Since φ
is kept private by the user, the cloud server cannot learn
the real values of cu,v .
• Query: To perform an α-CSD query with an origin s, a
destination t, and a cost constraint θ, the user generates
query tokens τs = h(K, s||1) and τt = h(K, t||2),
and sends them to the cloud server. The cloud server
obtains Iout[τs] and Iin[τt] from the index. For each
encrypted vertex identifier v that appears in both Iout[τs]
and Iin[τt], the cloud server performs a cost constraint
filtering operation (which will be described in details
in Section VI), and adds each pair (Ds,v, Dv,t) which
satisfies the cost constraint φθ into a candidate set Y .
Note that the cost constraint is multiplied by φ because
we encrypt the cost φcu,v , instead of cu,v .
Then, the cloud server directly obtains d =
∑|Y |
i=1 di,
where di = SWHE.Eval(×, Dis,v, Div,t) for each pair
(Dis,v, D
i
v,t) in Y . The correctness of the above calcula-
tion follows homomorphic properties of SWHE. We refer
the readers to [1] for more details.
Finally, the cloud server returns d to the user, who,
in turn, obtains the answer to the α-CSD query by
decrypting d with its secret key sk.
Note that this straightforward approach does not only cor-
rectly answer the α-CSD query over encrypted graphs, but also
protects the vertex identifier, distance, and cost information.
Algorithm 1 Setup algorithm for GraphEnc1
Input: A secret key K, a key pair (pk, sk), an approximation ratio α, an
amplification factor φ, and an original graph G.
Output: The encrypted graph index ∆˜.
1: Generate the 2-hop labeling index ∆ = {∆out,∆in} from G.
2: Initialize two dictionaries Iout and Iin.
3: Let B be the maximum distance over all the sketches and set N = 2B+1.
4: for each u ∈ G do
5: Set Tout,u = h(K,u||1), Tin,u = h(K,u||2).
6: for each (v, du,v , cu,v) ∈ ∆out(u) do
7: Compute V = h(K, v||0).
8: Compute Du,v = SWHE.Enc(pk, 2N−du,v ).
9: Compute Cu,v = ORE.Enc(K,φcu,v).
10: Insert (V,Du,v , Cu,v) into the dictionary Iout[Tout,u].
11: end for
12: Repeat the above procedure for each sketch in ∆in(u) and add entries
into Iin[Tin,u].
13: end for
14: return ∆˜ = {Iout, Iin} as the encrypted graph index.
Algorithm 2 Setup algorithm for GraphEnc2
Input: A secret key K, a key pair (pk, sk), an approximation ratio α, an
amplification factor φ, and an original graph G.
Output: The encrypted graph index ∆˜.
1: Generate the 2HCLI ∆ = {∆out,∆in} of G.
2: Initialize two dictionary Iout and Iin.
3: Let B be the maximum distance over the sketches and set N = 2B+ 1.
4: for each u ∈ G do
5: Set Sout,u = h(K,u||1), Tout,u = h(K,u||2), Sin,u =
h(K,u||3), and Tin,u = h(K,u||4).
6: Initialize a counter ω = 0
7: for each (v, du,v , cu,v) ∈ ∆out(u) do
8: Compute V = h(K, v||0).
9: Compute Du,v = SWHE.Enc(pk, 2N−du,v ).
10: Compute Cu,v = ORE.Enc(K,φcu,v).
11: Set Tout,u,v = h(Tout,u, ω) and Sout,u,v = g(Sout,u, ω).
12: Compute Ψu,v = Sout,u,v ⊕ (V ||Du,v ||Cu,v).
13: Set Iout[Tout,u,v ] = Ψu,v .
14: Set ω = ω + 1.
15: end for
16: Repeat the above procedure for each sketch in ∆in(u) and obtain
Iin[Tin,u,v ], except that: (i) set Tin,u,v = h(Tin,u, ω) and Sin,u,v =
g(Sin,u, ω), and (ii) compute Ψu,v = Sin,u,v ⊕ (V ||Du,v ||Cu,v).
17: end for
18: return ∆˜ = {Iout, Iin} as the encrypted graph index.
However, the encrypted graph index obtained from Al-
gorithm 1, without performing any queries, still results in
information leakage. On one hand, it reveals the length of each
encrypted sketch, i.e., Iout[u] and Iin[u], as well as the order
information of ORE-encrypted costs in all sketches. On the
other hand, it also discloses the number of common vertices
between Iout[u] and Iin[v], which indicates the number of
vertices that connect u to v. In particular, if the cloud server
knows that there is no common vertex between Iout[u] and
Iin[v], it learns that u cannot reach v.
B. Privacy-preserving α-CSD Querying
In order to enhance protection of sensitive information,
we construct a privacy-preserving α-CSD querying scheme
GraphEnc2 = (KeyGen, Setup,Query), where the key
generation procedure is the same as in GraphEnc1, with
improved index construction and CSD query procedures as
exhibited in Algorithms 2 and 3, respectively.
The Setup for GraphEnc2 works as follows. The user
first builds the 2HCLI ∆ of graph G, and then encrypts
7Algorithm 3 Query algorithm for GraphEnc2
Input: The user’s input are the secret key K, secret key pair (pk, sk), an
amplification factor Φ, and the query q = (s, t, θ). The cloud server’s
input is the encrypted index ∆˜.
Output: user’s output is distq and cloud server’s output is ⊥.
1: user generates Sout,s = h(K, s||1), Tout,s = h(K, s||2), Sin,t =
h(K, t||3) and Tin,t = h(K, t||4).
2: user constructs a cost constraint tree Tθ based on φ ∗ θ using secret K
as described in Section VI.
3: user sends τs,t = (Sout,s, Tout,s, Sin,t, Tin,t, Tθ) to cloud server.
4: cloud server parses τs,t as (Sout,s, Tout,s, Sin,t, Tin,t, Tθ).
5: cloud server initializes a set Ls and a counter ω = 0.
6: cloud server computes Tout,s,v = h(Tout,s, ω).
7: while Iout[Tout,s,v ] 6= ⊥ do
8: cloud server computes Sout,s,v = g(Sout,s, ω).
9: cloud server performs (V ||Ds,v ||Cs,v) = Ψs,v ⊕ Sout,s,v .
10: cloud server add (V,Ds,v , Cs,v) into Ls.
11: Set ω = ω + 1.
12: cloud server computes Tout,s,v = h(Tout,s, ω).
13: end while
14: cloud server initializes a set Lt and a counter ω = 0.
15: cloud server computes Tin,v,t = h(Tin,t, ω).
16: while Iin[Tin,v,t] 6= ⊥ do
17: cloud server computes Sin,v,t = g(Sin,t, ω).
18: cloud server performs (V ||Dv,t||Cv,t) = Ψv,t ⊕ Sin,v,t.
19: cloud server add (V,Dv,t, Cv,t) into Lt.
20: Set ω = ω + 1.
21: cloud server computes Tin,v,t = h(Tin,t, ω).
22: end while
23: For each encrypted vertex identifier v that appears in both in Ls and Lt,
the cloud server performs the cost constraint filtering operation through
Algorithm 4, and add the pair (Ds,v , Dv,t) which satisfies the cost
constraint φθ into a set Y . The pair that Algorithm 4 cannot verify is
also added into Y .
24: For each pair in Y , the cloud server first computes di =
SWHE.Eval(×, Dis,v , Div,t), and then computes d =
∑|Y |
i=1 di.
25: cloud server returns d to the user.
26: user decrypts d with sk.
27: return Decrypted value of d as distq .
sketches associated with u ∈ G (i.e., ∆out(u) and ∆in(u)),
as described in lines 2-17.
Note that in order to prevent the leakage of the sketch size in
the previous straightforward approach, we split each encrypted
sketch Iout(u) and Iin(u), and ensure that they are stored in
the dictionary separately, with a size of one. More precisely,
we utilize a counter ω and generate the unique Tout,u,v and
Sout,u,v for each entity in ∆out(u) (line 11). Similarly, the
unique Tin,u,v and Sin,u,v for each entity in ∆in(u) can be
generated (line 16). The Tout,u,v (or Tin,u,v) indicates the
position that this entity will be stored in Iout (or Iin), which
ensures each position in the dictionary Iout (or Iin) having
only one entity.
Sout,u,v (or Sin,u,v) is used to make an XOR operation
with (V ||Du,v||Cu,v). Since Sout,u,v (or Sin,u,v) is different
for each sketch, the XOR operation makes the resulting Ψu,v
indistinguishable, which guarantees that the static encrypted
graph index ∆˜ reveals neither the number of common vertices
between Iout(u) and Iin(v), nor the order information of costs.
The Query in Algorithm 3 works as follows. Assume that
the user asks for the shortest distance between s and t, whose
total cost does not exceed θ. She first generates the query
token τs,t and sends it to the cloud server (lines 1-3). Upon
receiving the token τs,t, the cloud server searches in the index
and obtains Ls and Lt (lines 5-22). That is, the cloud server
iteratively judges whether the dictionary Iout (Iin) contains
the key Tout,s,v (Tin,v,t) or not. If it exists, then it adds the
corresponding entity into the set Ls (Lt).
Once Ls and Lt are obtained, the cloud server performs
the cost constraint filtering (line 23) and computes d (line
24), which are the same as described in the straightforward
approach. Finally, the user gets the final answer by decrypting
d, which is returned by the cloud server, using its sk.
VI. TREE-BASED CIPHERTEXTS COMPARISON APPROACH
This section introduces a tree-based ciphertexts comparison
approach, which is used for cost constraint filtering in the
graph encryption scheme described in Section V.
A. Scenarios
Assume that there is a user (i.e., U) and a server (i.e.,
R). U has many integers which are encrypted by a kind
of cryptography algorithm and then outsourced to R. Now,
U wants to ask for R to obtain integer pairs, e.g., (x, y),
whose sum does not exceed θ. Note that the plaintexts of x,
y and θ could not be disclosed to R, except for the greater-
than, equality, or less-than relationship. A naive approach is
to download all the integers, calculate the summation locally,
and choose the integer pairs satisfying the constraint. This
method, however, is meaningless if one wants to offload the
computation to the cloud. Hence, it is desirable to have a
practical solution to this problem.
Note that this scenario is different from the well-known
SMC scheme. In the setting of SMC [41, 42], a set of (two or
more) parties with private inputs wish to compute a function
of their inputs while revealing nothing but the result of the
function, which is used for many practical applications, such as
exchange markets. SMC is a collaborative computing problem
that solves the privacy preserving problem among a group of
mutually untrusted participants. The ciphertexts of all pairs
of (x, y) and the cost constraint θ are outsourced to the
cloud server, which is responsible for the inequality tests.
Furthermore, we could reveal the relationship between the sum
of two ciphertexts and another ciphertext to the server, which
is referred to as controlled disclosure in the literature [17].
It seems that we might leverage the homomorphic encryp-
tion technique, since it supports a sum operation of calculating
x+ y. Nevertheless, as the homomorphic encryption is prob-
abilistic, we are unable to determine the relationship between
x+ y and θ over their ciphertexts.
B. Main Idea
The main idea of the tree-based ciphertexts comparison
protocol is to encode an integer with the ORE primitive. To the
best of our knowledge, none of the existing approaches can
support ORE and homomorphism properties simultaneously.
Hence, we design a novel method to address this problem,
which is motivated by the following facts.
If we want to compare x+y with θ, we can compare x with
θ/2 and y with θ/2, respectively. Now, we result in 4 possible
cases corresponding to combinations of the two relationships.
If x > θ/2 (x ≤ θ/2) and y > θ/2 (y ≤ θ/2), we can know
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Fig. 6. An example of the cost constraint tree with a depth of 3, where circles
represent nodes. The boxes in the dashed rectangle indicate path codes for all
possible comparison results. Note that these boxes are not a part of the tree.
that x+y > θ (x+y ≤ θ). In the rest two cases, i.e., x > θ/2
and y < θ/2, or x ≤ θ/2 and y ≥ θ/2, we cannot achieve a
deterministic result. At this point, we can further divide θ/2
into θ/4. And then we can compare x and y with θ/4 and
3θ/4, respectively.
By iteratively performing such an operation, we can deter-
mine the relationship between x+ y and θ with an increasing
probability. Due to the ORE property, it is easy to perform the
above operations over ciphertexts. Next, we will show how to
implement this idea efficiently by utilizing a tree structure.
C. Details of Protocol
To implement the comparison of x + y and θ over their
ciphertexts, we construct a cost constraint tree, whose nodes
represent specific values that are related to θ. For clarity, we
define E(m) as the ORE ciphertext of m.
An example of the tree structure is depicted in Fig. 6. For
each node, we assign 0 to its left child path, while 1 to the
right child path. If an integer is not greater than the value of
this node, we take the left child path for further comparison;
otherwise, we take the right child path. Thus, for any path from
the root node to a leaf node, we can obtain a path code, which
is an effective representation of the comparison procedure. For
instance, an incoming integer 5θ/16 would traverse Nodes
E(θ/2), E(θ/4), and E(3θ/8), and thereby end with a path
code of 010. We define the length (i.e., the number of bits) of
a path code as β. Note that β is actually equal to the depth
of the tree which is denoted by dθ.
Now the relationship between x+y and θ can be determined
as follows. We first get the ORE ciphertexts of x and y, as well
as their path codes cx and cy by traversing the tree separately.
When computing cx+cy , if an overflow occurs (i.e., cx+cy ≥
2β), we know that x+y > θ with confidence. If cx+cy ≤ 2β−
2, we also know that x + y ≤ θ with confidence. Otherwise,
we are unable to determine the relationship and end up with
an uncertainty. We summarize this procedure in Algorithm 4.
Discussion. Observe that when we go through a cost con-
straint tree, one more step can further reduce the uncertainty
of the relationship between x + y and θ by half. We denote
the probability of uncertainty as
Pr[¬certainty] = ( 12 )
β .
where β is the length of the path code. We can easily know
the probability of certainty is
Algorithm 4 Tree-Based Ciphertexts Comparison Algorithm
Input: Two ORE ciphertexts E(x), E(y) and a cost constraint tree whose
depth is dθ .
Output: The relationship between x+ y and θ.
1: Initialize a counter ω = 1 and two empty strings cx and cy .
2: while ω ≤ dθ do
3: Visit the ω-th level of the tree with E(x) and concatenate cx with
corresponding 0 or 1.
4: Visit the ω-th level of the tree with E(y) and concatenate cy with
corresponding 0 or 1.
5: Set ω = ω + 1.
6: end while
7: if cx + cy ≥ 2ω then
8: return >.
9: end if
10: if cx + cy ≤ 2ω − 2 then
11: return ≤.
12: end if
13: return uncertainty.
Pr[certainty] = 1− Pr[¬certainty] = 1− ( 12 )
β .
When the tree depth is 6 (e.g., β = 6), the probability of
certainty could reach about 0.9844.
Another observation is the comparison procedure reveals
the order information between x (or y) and θ. Thus, the
server can infer the interval that x belongs to with precision
of 2−β . To prevent the server from inferring the real value
of x, in Connor, the user randomly picks a big integer
number φ that is applied to x, y, and θ simultaneously, which
significantly enlarges the plaintext and ciphertext spaces (e.g.,
2128). The value of β is generally a small integer (e.g., 6 in our
implementation) that is determined by the user, and both φ and
θ are kept secret by the user. Therefore, the server cannot infer
the real value of x (or y) from the order relationship among
ciphertexts. We will formally analyze the leakage functions
and security issues in the next section.
VII. COMPLEXITY AND SECURITY ANALYSES
This section presents the complexity and security analyses
on the proposed graph encryption scheme Connor.
A. Complexity Analysis
Connor mainly consists of the Setup and Query algorithms,
as described in Algorithms 2 and 3.
The dominant component in determining the complexity
of the Setup algorithm is the encryption of the plain 2HCLI
generated from a graph G. Let µ be the total sketch for all
vertices in G, then the time complexity and space complexity
are both O(nµ), where n is the number of vertices in G.
The Query algorithm consists of a query token generation
process on the user side and a CSD query process on the cloud
server side. Let η be the maximum size of the sketch associ-
ated with each vertex in G. The complexity of the query token
generation process is mainly determined by the construction
of a cost constraint tree, whose time complexity and space
complexity are both O(2dθ ). For the CSD querying process,
the time complexity of getting Ls and Lt, performing cost
constraint filtering, and performing distance computation are
O(η), O(ηdθ), and O(η), respectively. The space complexity
of the above three components are O(η), O(η + 2dθ ), and
9O(η), respectively. Therefore, the total time complexity and
space complexity of the CSD querying process are O(ηdθ)
and O(η + 2dθ ), respectively.
B. Security Analysis
We now present the security analysis on Connor. For
clarity, we first discuss the leakage functions, and then prove
that Connor is secure under the CQA2-security model.
Setup Leakage. The leakage function LSetup of our
construction reveals the information that can be de-
duced from the secure 2HCLI ∆˜ of graph G, in-
cluding the total number of vertices in the graph n,
the maximum distance over all the sketches B =
maxu∈Vmax{(v,du,v,cu,v)∈∆out,(v,du,v,cu,v)∈∆in}du,v , and the
size of ∆˜. More precisely, the size of ∆˜ consists of the total
number of sketch entities in Iout and Iin, which are denoted
by Ωout and Ωin, respectively. Thus, the leakage function
LSetup = (n,B,Ωout,Ωin).
Note that the order relationship of pairwise costs and the
order relationship between the cost and cost constraint are not
included in LSetup, because for each entity in sketches, we
make an XOR operation using a unique integer value after
we encrypt it, and this makes each entity in sketches are
indistinguishable.
Query Leakage. The leakage function LQuery of our
construction consists of the query pattern leakage, the sketch
pattern leakage, and the cost pattern leakage. Intuitively, the
query pattern leakage reveals whether a query has appeared be-
fore. The sketch pattern leakage reveals the sketch associated
to a queried vertex, the common vertices between two different
sketches, and the size of the sketches of queried vertices. The
cost pattern leakage reveals 1) the order relationship among
costs, and 2) the order relationship between costs and the
cost constraint during the query procedure. We formalize these
leakage functions as follows.
Definition 4. (QUERY PATTERN LEAKAGE). Let q =
(q1, q2, . . . , qm) be a non-empty sequence of queries. Each
query qi specifies a tuple (ui, vi, θi). For any two queries qi
and qj , define Sim(qi, qj) = (ui = uj , vi = vj , θi = θj), i.e.,
whether each element of qi = (ui, vi, θi) matches each element
of qj = (uj , vj , θj), respectively. Then, the query pattern
leakage function LQP (q) returns an m × m (symmetric)
matrix, in which each entry (i, j) equals Sim(qi, qj). Note
that LQP (q) does not leak the identities of the query vertices.
Definition 5. (SKETCH PATTERN LEAKAGE). Given a se-
cure 2HCLI ∆˜ of a graph G and a query q = (u, v, θ),
the sketch pattern leakage function LSP (∆˜, q) is defined as
(Σ,Υ). Σ is a list, each element of which is the sketches asso-
ciated to the queried vertices, and Υ is a pair (X,Z), where
X = h(v) : (v, d, c) ∈ Iout and Z = h(v) : (v, d, c) ∈ Iin are
multi-sets and h : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is a particular
pseudo-random function.
Definition 6. (COST PATTERN LEAKAGE). The cost con-
straint θ in a query q can essentially be represented by a
certain number of uniform intervals. Let dθ be the depth of
the cost constraint tree Tθ (c.f. Section VI). The intervals asso-
ciated with θ are [(i− 1)θ/2dθ , iθ/2dθ ], where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2dθ .
Assign each interval with a list µ, i.e., the i-th interval is
associated with µi, which stores all the cost values belong to
this interval. The leaked interval information forms an array
Arr, of which the i-th element is µi (i.e., Arr[i] = µi). In
addition, assume that z is the total number of entries in the
sketches of the queried vertices. For each pair of costs ci and
cj , its order relationship of the greater-than, equality, and
less-than can be represented by 1, 0, and −1, respectively.
The leaked order information of costs is a z × z (symmetric)
matrix ∇ with each entry (i, j) being 1, 0, or −1. Therefore,
the cost pattern leakage function LCP (∆˜, q) = (Arr,∇).
Thus, LQuery = (LQP (q),LSP (∆˜, q),LCP (∆˜, q)).
The leakage functions are defined over the 2HCLI rather
than the original graph. In fact, the information leakage of
the original graph is limited to the minimum number of paths
for the queried source-destination vertices. It can be defined
as an n × n (symmetric) matrix Λ, where n is the number
of vertices in the graph. Each element in Λ is NULL, 0, or
a positive integer, which indicates an uncertain status (i.e.,
topology is well protected), disconnection, or the minimum
number of paths of the two queried vertices, respectively.
For the cost values in the 2HCLI, we introduce a user-held
amplification factor φ to enlarge the plaintext and ciphertext
spaces. Thus, the server cannot infer the real cost values just
from their order information revealed by the leakage function
LCP (∆˜, q)). For the distance values in the 2HCLI, we use the
SWHE encryption to protect their real values from the server.
Theorem 1. If the cryptography primitives g, h, ORE, and
the SWHE are secure, then the proposed graph encryption
scheme Π = (KeyGen, Setup,Query) is (LSetup,LQuery)-
secure against the adaptive chosen-query attack.
Proof. The key idea is constructing a simulator S. Given the
leakage functions LSetup and LQuery, S constructs a fake
encrypted 2HCLI structure ∆˜∗ = {I∗out, I∗in} and a list of
query q∗. If for all PPT adversaries A, they cannot distinguish
between the two games Real and Ideal, we can say that our
graph encryption scheme is (LSetup,LQuery)-secure against
the adaptive chosen-query attack.
Simulating ∆˜∗. S handles each vertex ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to
generate a fake I∗out in 2HCLI based on the leakage function
LSetup. S randomly chooses wi for ui with
∑n
1 wi = Ωout,
and samples li ← {0, 1}λ and ηi ← {0, 1}λ uniformly
without repetition. For all 0 ≤ i < wi, S takes the following
steps to simulate each sketch: S computes lwi = h(li, wi)
and ηwi = h(ηi, wi), where h is a particular pseudo-random
function. Then, it encrypts each vertex v in the sketch of ui by
computing V ∗ = h(K∗, v||0), where K∗ is a fake secret key.
It randomly generates two integers d and c and obtains cipher-
texts D∗ and C∗ by encrypting 2N−d (N = 2B+1) and c using
the SWHE and ORE schemes. Let Ψ∗i = ηwi⊕(V ∗||D∗||C∗).
S stores Ψ∗ in the index I∗out. That is, I∗out[lwi ] = Ψ∗i .
Similarly, S generates a fake I∗in and finally obtains the fake
2HCLI ∆˜∗ = {I∗out, I∗in}.
Simulating q∗. Given the leakage function LQuery =
(LQP (q),LSP (∆˜, q),LCP (∆˜, q)), S simulates the query to-
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ken as follows. S first checks if either of the queried vertices
s and t has appeared in any previous query. If s appeared
previously, S sets S∗out,s and T ∗out,s to the values that were
previously used. Otherwise, it sets T ∗out,s = li and S
∗
out,s = ηi
for some previously unused li and ηi. It then remembers the
association among ηi, li, and s. S takes the same steps for
the queried vertex t: setting S∗in,t and T
∗
in,t analogously and
associating t with the selected ηi and li.
To simulate a fake cost constraint tree T ∗θ , S first checks if
the queried θ appeared in any previous query. If θ appeared
previously, S sets the T ∗θ to the value that was previously
used. Otherwise, S constructs a full binary tree based θ and
encrypts each tree node by using the ORE scheme with a
randomly generated key. S returns this encrypted tree as T ∗θ .
S simulates the query procedure as follows. Given the query
token (S∗out,s, T
∗
out,s, S
∗
in,t, T
∗
in,t, T
∗
θ ), S first checks if the
query has been queried before. If yes, S returns the value
that was previously used as the query result. Otherwise, S
checks whether the queried vertex s (or t) has been queried
before. If the query vertex s has appeared in a previous query,
S sets L∗s to the values that were previously used from Σ of
LSP (f˜ , q). Otherwise, for a newly appeared vertex s, S takes
the following steps: To generate the sketches associated with
s, S first initializes a set L∗s and a counter ω∗ = 0, Then, it
iteratively computes T ∗out,s,v = h(T
∗
out,s, w∗) and S
∗
out,s,v =
g(S∗out,s, w∗), and adds the tuple (V
∗, D∗s,v, C
∗
s,v) into L
∗
s ,
until I∗out[T
∗
out,s,v] does not exist, where (V
∗, D∗s,v, C
∗
s,v) =
I∗out[T
∗
out,s,v] ⊕ S∗out,s,v . Similarly, S obtains the set L∗t for
vertex t. Upon obtaining L∗s and L
∗
t , S performs cost constraint
filtering operation based on T ∗θ to get the candidate set Y
∗. The
theorem then follows from the CPA-security of SWHE. That
is, S performs the SWHE computation over Y ∗ and returns
the query result.
Since the cryptography primitives g, h, ORE, and SWHE are
secure, the fake 2HCLI structure ∆˜∗ and the query sequence
q∗ are indistinguishable from the real ones. Therefore, for all
PPT adversaries A, they cannot distinguish between the two
games Real and Ideal. Thus, we have
|Pr[RealΠ,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealΠ,A,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
where negl(λ) is a negligible function.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the evaluation of our graph encryption
scheme through experiments on real-world datasets.
A. Setup
Testbed. We implement the method introduced in [2] for
building the 2HCLI. The ORE and SWHE in our imple-
mentation follow the methods described in [15] and [16],
respectively. The GMP library is used for big integer arith-
metic. We set the security parameter λ = 128 and use the
OpenSSL library for all the basic cryptographic primitives.
All the algorithms in our experiment are implemented in C++.
The experiments are conducted on a desktop PC equipped with
Intel Xeon processor at 2.6 GHz and 8 GB RAM.
TABLE II
THE GRAPH DATASETS USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS
Dataset Nodes Edges Storage
Email-EuAll 21,721 34,351 335KB
soc-Epinions1 6,506 47,062 418KB
p2p-Gnutella25 22,687 54,705 632KB
p2p-Gnutella04 10,876 39,994 422KB
Graph sets. The datesets used in our experiments are
listed in Table II. All these datasets are publicly available
from the Standford SNAP website3 and modeled as directed
graphs. For the datasets soc-Epinions1 and Email-EuAll, we
randomly select their subsets to make the index construction
feasible with the limited computational resources. Since these
graphs are unweighted, we generate a distance and a cost for
each edge, the value of which follows a uniform distribution
between 1 and 100. The cost criterion is used as the constraint.
Methods to compare. Since this is the first work to
address the CSD querying problem over encrypted graphs, we
compare our method with the one over unencrypted graphs.
We implement such a method following the state-of-the-art
method over plaintext graphs introduced in [2]. The only
difference is that we construct 2HCLI over the original graph,
instead of an overlay graph. As a result, our implementation
has a higher query efficiency but leads to a higher complexity
of the index construction.
Query sets. We randomly generate 200 queries over each
dataset. The origin s and destination t in each query are also
randomly selected. The cost constraint θ for each (s, t) pair
is set as follows. We denote the lower bound cmin as the
minimum cost of all paths from s to t, and the upper bound
cmax as the minimum cost of the paths with the shortest
distance from s to t. If the cost constraint θ < cmin, there will
be no feasible answer to the query; and if the cost constraint
θ > cmax, the shortest distance is always a valid answer to
the query. To mitigate the impact of θ on the performance, we
randomly choose 50 values of θ for each query, which falls in
the interval [cmin, cmax].
Another important parameter is α, which determines the
approximation guarantees of α-CSD queries. Since α is a
constant value for all queries, we view it as a system parameter
rather than part of specific queries. In order to achieve a
balance between query accuracy and system efficiency, we set
the approximation ratio α = 1.5 for all queries.
B. Evaluation of Secure 2HCLI and Query Token
Index Size and Construction Time. The index construction
of the graph is a one-time and offline computation. This
process consists of two steps: one is constructing the plain
2HCLI, which is the same as the index construction process
of the original plain CSD querying, and the other is encrypting
the plain 2HCLI, which is the focus of this paper. Therefore,
we consider the outputs of the first step as the index of
unencrypted graph.
3http://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF INDEX CONSTRUCTION COST
Metrics Plain Graph Query Connor
Time
(mins)
Size
(MB)
Time
(mins)
Size
(MB)
D1: Email-EuAll 862.03 8.99 869.84 48.14
D2: soc-Epinions1 7093.25 5.76 7098.44 32.79
D3: p2p-Gnutella25 4206.96 138.50 4306.31 514.46
D4: p2p-Gnutella04 3007.91 63.12 3054.55 297.95
The index size and construction time are depicted in Table
III. Note that the index size and construction time of different
datasets have a great difference, which is mainly caused by
the difference in graph topologies. Different from the original
shortest distance query, where there is only one shortest path
between any two vertices, in the CSD querying problem, there
usually exist multiple constrained shortest paths between any
two vertices. Intuitively, a dense graph may bear a higher index
construction cost than a sparse one.
In general, the size of each encrypted index is roughly
6× larger than that of the corresponding plain index. The
most important observation is that the index construction
time of encrypted graphs is slightly higher than the one
of unencrypted graphs. Thus, the key point of improving
the index construction efficiency over an encrypted graph is
accelerating the process of constructing the plain 2HCLI of
that graph. We leave this attempt as the future work.
Query Token Generation. The construction of query to-
kens is independent of specific graphs, we now analyze the
size and generation time of a query token. The query token
mainly consists of 5 elements, namely Sout,s, Tout,s, Sin,t,
Tin,t, and Tθ. Each of the first 4 elements has a length of 16
bytes. Since the size of each ORE ciphertext is 16 bytes, a cost
tree Tθ whose depth is dθ has a size of 16× (2dθ − 1) bytes.
Therefore, the total size of a query token is 16×(2dθ+3) bytes.
Since dθ is a relatively small value, the size of a query token
is usually less than 1 KB. The query token generation time
with varying dθ is depicted in Table IV. Although the query
token generation time increases significantly with dθ, the time
cost is moderate for general cases (e.g., when dθ ≤ 6).
TABLE IV
THE QUERY TOKEN GENERATION TIME FOR DIFFERENT dθ
dθ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time (ms) 0.15 0.31 0.65 1.22 2.46 4.95 9.88 19.77
C. Evaluation of Query Efficiency and Accuracy
Query Efficiency. To evaluate the query efficiency, for each
θ, we generate the cost constraint tree with a different depth
dθ. The query time is defined as the time interval from the
submission of a query token to the receival of its query results.
We compute the average query time of 200 queries.
The average query time with varying dθ over the encrypted
2HCLI is depicted in Fig. 7, where dθ increases from 1 to
6. We can see that the query time varies a lot for different
graph datasets. For each dataset, increasing dθ can result in
a decrease in the query time. This is because a larger dθ can
filter out more distance pairs exceeding the cost constraint
and thereby reduce the number of candidates for distance
computation using SWHE, which is the dominant operation
in time consumption.
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Fig. 7. The query time over encrypted 2HCLI with varying dθ .
Fig. 8 presents the query time in the plain and encrypted
scenarios for different datasets. The query time over the
encrypted 2HCLI is higher than that over the plain 2HCLI
because of the time-consuming operations on ciphertexts (e.g.,
the cost filtering and distance computation). Also, the time
complexity of these operations is closely related to the size of
a graph index listed in Table III, which leads to the difference
among four datasets in Fig. 8.
Query Accuracy. In Connor, there are two components
that affect the query accuracy, namely the tree-based cipher-
texts comparison and the distance computation. The former
may keep some distance pairs that do not satisfy the cost
constraint in the candidate set Y , while the latter leverages the
property of SWHE to obtain an approximate, but not exact,
shortest distance based on all candidates in Y .
We use the well-known metric Precision (P) to evaluate the
accuracy of the cost constraint filtering process. P = TpTp+Fp ,
where Tp and Fp represent the numbers of distance pairs in
Y whose costs truly satisfy or exceed the cost constraint,
respectively. We use the same query as introduced above, and
compute the P for each query. Finally, we can obtain the
average precision P¯ for all the queries.
Fig. 9 presents the relationship between the query precision
P¯ and the depth of the cost constraint tree dθ over different
datasets. We can see that for all the datasets, P¯ increases with
dθ, because the cost constraint tree with a larger depth dθ helps
us to detect constraint violations with a higher probability, as
discussed in Section VI. In particular, P¯ is more than 94% for
all datasets when dθ = 6.
To evaluate the accuracy of the final query results, we
propose a metric named the deviation rate. Let re and rp be the
query results returned by Connor and the algorithm over the
corresponding plain graphs, respectively. Then, we define the
deviation rate ξ = re/rp, which indicates how far re deviates
from rp. Obviously, a deviation rate closer to 1 depicts more
accurate query results.
Fig. 10 presents the cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) of the deviation rate over the dataset p2p-Gnutella04.
We can see that ξ is larger than 0.90 for over 80% of the query
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Fig. 9. The query precision for different depth dθ
of the cost tree.
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Fig. 10. The CDF of deviation rate for different
query (dθ = 6).
results, and larger than 0.73 in the worst cases. Therefore,
Connor is capable of achieving a relatively high accuracy
with moderate computation complexity.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented Connor, the first graph
encryption scheme that enables the cloud-based approximate
CSD queries. In particular, we proposed a tree-based ci-
phertexts comparison protocol for cost constraint filtering
with controlled disclosure. The security analysis showed that
Connor could achieve the CQA2-security. We implemented
a prototype and evaluated the performance using the real-
world graph datasets. The evaluation results demonstrated the
effectiveness of Connor. In the future work, we plan to design
techniques to support dynamic index updates.
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